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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Several contemporary virtue ethicists have provided systematic presentations of 
normative virtue ethics.  The virtue ethical literature, however, does not contain much 
information on the meta-ethical roots of virtue theories.  The present paper seeks to 
address this deficiency by examining the neo-Aristotelianism of Rosalind Hursthouse in 
an effort to ascertain what meta-ethical commitments are most consistent with her theory; 
these commitments are shown to be cognitivism, objectivism, and (in some form) 
naturalism.  These positions are then put into dialogue with Moore’s seminal metaethical 
arguments against naturalism and agent-relative value.  Ultimately I show that the 
literature on normative virtue ethics is rich enough to provide powerful responses to 
Moorean criticisms.   
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Virtue Ethics and Moore’s Criticisms of Naturalism 
 
Introduction 
Perhaps the most seminal meta-ethical text in the English-speaking 
philosophical tradition is G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica.1,2   In this work, Moore lays out 
his famed criticisms of naturalism and makes a case for why the property “good” must be 
a simple, non-natural property incapable of philosophical analysis.  These arguments 
served, collectively, as part of the springboard that propelled meta-ethical debate into a 
position of contemporary prominence.  Contemporary virtue ethics, by contrast, did not 
until recently have a work that could claim both systematicity and a relative degree of 
authoritativeness; the most important work in virtue ethics over the past century has been 
in the form of influential but non-comprehensive short pieces.   
Complicating matters is the fact that “virtue ethics” is not univocal; rather, it is 
an umbrella-term encompassing a variety of approaches that, while bearing a great deal 
of similarity to each other, are distinct from one another.  For instance, one can (and 
should) distinguish between the neo-Aristotelian approach of philosophers such as 
Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Alasdair MacIntyre and the agent-based 
approach to virtue ethics advocated by Michael Slote and others.  Each of these variations 
on the virtue-ethical theme has its own set of commitments, advantages and 
disadvantages.  But what they share, in addition to their theoretical overlap, is a 
                                                 
1 Many contemporary introductory books to meta-ethics begin with considerations of Moore’s arguments 
here.  As an example, see Miller, Alexander. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2003). 
2 All quotes hereafter from Moore are from Moore, George. Principia Ethica. (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 
1988). 
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conspicuous absence.  What is absent from virtue ethics, generally speaking, is a 
sufficiently detailed account of the meta-ethical views with which virtue-ethical theories 
are most consistent.  Some may be skeptical of the need for this type of systematicity, but 
I’m going to operate under the assumption that a normative theory, even if it happens to 
be adequate in its own right, cannot be fully understood unless one also grasps the way it 
is supposed to meta-ethically map onto the world.  That’s just to say that it is difficult or 
perhaps impossible to gain a deep and full appreciation of an ethical theory without also 
surveying the theory through the lens of meta-ethics; undertaking such a survey gives one 
a richer understanding of both the theory’s foundational structure as well the meaning of 
its key terms . 
The current lack of such a meta-ethical survey of virtue ethics is doubtless the 
product of the relative novelty of its approach.  Indeed, one might argue that it makes 
little sense – at least from a pragmatic standpoint – to go through the bother of working 
out unique and elaborate meta-ethical arguments designed to ground and support a 
normative theory when the details of the normative theory have yet to be fleshed out.  
There have been a few recent attempts to provide a systematic overview of normative 
virtue ethics, of which Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics is, in my opinion, the most 
accessible.3,4  This essay is an attempt to examine the meta-ethical implications of 
                                                 
3 Michael Slote’s From Morality to Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), for instance, is largely 
concerned with distinguishing his version of virtue ethics from Kantian, utilitarian, and commonsense 
ethics, showing why he regards his theory as the superior alternative.  Hursthouse’s book is much less 
focused on providing criticism of alternative theories, and as such avoids many technical issues of 
secondary importance to presenting an initial account of virtue ethics. 
4 All references to Hursthouse henceforth are from Hursthouse, Rosalind.  On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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Hursthouse’s normative ethics, with special attention paid to those aspects that may be of 
critical concern for someone operating under Moorean assumptions. 
I begin with an involved analysis of Hursthouse’s virtue ethics in an attempt to 
uncover what, if any, meta-ethical roots her normative theory has (or, failing that, what 
set of meta-ethical commitments is most consistent with her normative theory).  After this 
consideration of Hursthouse, I’ll provide a brief explication of Moore’s critical views of 
naturalism and agent relative value.  Here I’ll use his discussion of egoism as a 
paradigmatic example illustrating the most important of his contentions on these matters.  
Then I will suggest ways in which Moore’s arguments might be applied to Hursthouse’s 
arguments and indicate ways in which she would likely respond to them.  The ultimate 
goal of this paper is to explore largely uncharted meta-ethical territory, or at least to view 
already familiar ground from the novel perspective of the virtue-ethicist, in a way that is 
as instructive as it is informative to those interested in arguing for the cogent foundations 
of a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic.  In doing so, I hope to both foster a richer 
understanding of Hursthouse’s normative theory and indicate ways in which it could be 
defended against Moorean meta-ethical arguments not directly discussed in her work – 
arguments that have the potential to shut down the virtue ethical approach altogether. 
Virtue Ethics 
 
Section Overview 
 
   My goal in this section is to examine Hursthouse’s eudaimonistic, neo-
Aristotelian normative theory in a manner that places special emphasis on the meta-
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ethical positions that might underlie and motivate it.5  I do not hope to be able to provide 
“the last word” on the meta-ethical foundations of her normative theory, but rather to 
indicate what aspects of her book I find to be the most meta-ethically salient.  Having 
done so, I will attempt to reverse-engineer, albeit in a sketch-like fashion, a set of meta-
ethical commitments with which her normative theory seems most consistent.   
The outline of this lengthy section is as follows.  I will begin by examining 
Hursthouse’s account of right action, indicating what concepts have relative priority in 
her theory.  I’ll then briefly characterize her ‘Neurathian’ program for building an ethics 
from within an ethical viewpoint.  From there, I will finish examining her normative 
ethics, including her enumeration of ‘the four ends of ethical naturalism’ and her account 
of the reasons virtuous agents have for acting.  Throughout, I will be paying special 
attention to the hierarchy of her presentation in an attempt to discover what concepts are 
most foundational and how such concepts might connect with relevant meta-ethical 
perspectives.  Finally, I will briefly flesh out and clarify the meanings of a few key meta-
ethical concepts in an effort to see how they map onto Hursthouse’s theory.  By the end 
of this section I aim to have shown why (and in what sense) I regard Hursthouse’s theory 
as one embracing naturalistic cognitivist objectivism. 
Hursthouse’s Normative Virtue Ethics 
 
Hursthouse’s substantive account of virtue ethics begins with the notion of right 
action.  This is a fitting starting point for her presentation, since critics of virtue ethics 
have historically cited the theory’s alleged inability to guide action (by determining what 
                                                 
5 From here on, whenever I use the term “virtue ethics,” I intend to refer exclusively to neo-Aristotelian 
theories. 
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actions are right or appropriate in particular circumstances) as being among its largest 
weaknesses.  The account she provides consists of two premises (one of which contains a 
sub-premise): 
P.1. – An action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances. 
P.1a. – A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character 
traits, namely, the virtues. 
P.2. – A virtue is a character trait that fulfills the criteria outlined by one 
of history’s influential theories of virtue.6 
As regards P.2., there are a number of possible conceptions of what qualifies a character 
trait as a virtue, but the one that Hursthouse prefers is the neo-Aristotelian account.  She 
describes this account as involving a number of relevant features, but for our purposes 
here the important one is that virtues are considered as being necessary for living a 
eudaimon or flourishing life.  These virtues are not just traits, but are also ‘excellences of 
character’ involving the employment and correct use of phronesis (practical wisdom) in 
order to ‘get things right’ about matters regarding action.7  Such practical wisdom 
involves, inter alia, the ability to recognize as salient the morally significant features of a 
relevant action, as well as the context in which the action occurs.  So a right action, on 
her account, is one that would be performed by someone possessing both practical 
wisdom as well as the excellences of character conducive to and necessary for a 
flourishing life.  At this early point, it is apparent that Hursthouse is a firm believer, 
although she does not address the matter directly, in cognitivism with respect to ethical 
utterances.  By setting up these necessary and sufficient conditions for what qualifies an 
act as right, she establishes a set of criteria for evaluating ethical expressions as true or 
                                                 
6 p. 28-9. 
7 p. 12-3. 
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false; if an action is, in fact, what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the 
circumstances then this makes the moral proposition “The action is right” true and “The 
action is wrong” false. 
Hursthouse’s account of right action differs in an important way from that 
proposed by Philippa Foot.  In contrast to Hursthouse, Foot maintains that there are 
certain types of action that are intrinsically right or wrong and that a virtue ethical theory 
that does not recognize this fact fails to fully capture the moral reality of the world in 
which we live and act.8  The intrinsic rightness or wrongness of actions that Foot seems 
to recognize here is not strictly a function of the character states or dispositions from 
which such actions arise (or would characteristically arise), but rather rightness or 
wrongness inhere – at least in some cases - in the action itself as distinct from the agent 
who produced it.9  Her arguments here seem to suggest that there are at least some cases 
in which deontic properties (such as being something that one ought or ought not do) 
have either priority over or reductive independence from areteic considerations (like the 
virtuous states of character belonging to good people or the vicious states belonging to 
bad people).  This is just to say that on Foot’s account, some actions are bad regardless of 
whether or not a virtuous agent would characteristically perform them in the 
circumstances and, thusly, that areteic considerations don’t always appear to be among 
the truth conditions for some evaluative statements.  In Hursthouse, by contrast, the 
rightness of an action is extrinsic to the particular action itself, as it is a function of the 
                                                 
8 Foot, Philippa.  Natural Goodness (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001). p. 115. 
9 David Copp and David Sobel note this dissimilarity between Foot and Hursthouse in “Morality and 
Virtue” Ethics 114 (April 2004): 514-554. 
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areteic states of character that produce it (or would counterfactually produce it, since her 
account of right action is given in terms of what a virtuous agent would do in particular 
circumstances); in Hursthouse such areteic considerations are considered to always be 
prior to deontic ones, at least in her account of right action. 
Now, the notion of a property or concept “having priority” over another is, 
unsurprisingly, not unambiguous.  There are at least three different ways in which 
something can be said to have priority over something else.  It can (1) have a larger 
amount of theoretical importance than that to which it is compared, (2) it can have 
conceptual or justificatory priority, in that the concept relative to which it is said to be 
prior logically or theoretically depends on the validity of the “prior” concept, or (3) it can 
be existentially prior, in that the “prior” or more basic property is considered to be a 
material condition for another property’s existence.10  For a simple example, consider for 
a moment G.E. Moore’s ideal consequentialism.  On his theory, the concept of “good” 
has priority, in the first sense, in ethics since it is “the only simple object of thought 
which is peculiar to Ethics.” 11  Likewise, the concept of “good” has priority (2) with 
respect to “right action” since he defines right actions as those which are productive of 
the most good (meaning that concept of “rightness” would be unintelligible or impossible 
                                                 
10 These senses of priority map on loosely to several senses of priority distinguished by Aristotle.  (1) is 
similar to Aristotle’s belief that essential properties have priority over accidental features (1065b2) since 
those things which have more theoretical importance within a theory are often, in virtue of this, more likely 
to be essential to the theory; (2) is similar to Aristotle’s claim that certain things are prior in knowledge and 
definition (1018b30); (3) is relevantly similar to Aristotle’s account of ‘natural priority’ (1010b37).  There 
are some conceptual differences between my formulations and Aristotle’s (largely stemming from my 
wishing to avoid some of his more esoteric metaphysical commitments) but I did take inspiration from him 
here; my distinctions here are somewhat more useful for the type of analysis I have in mind here.  
11 Moore, p. 5. 
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to justify without the concept of “good”).12  Finally, Moore’s account of “good” seems to 
imply that “good” is not prior, in the third sense of the term, to natural properties since he 
seems to suggest that an object’s possession of the property “good” is determined by its 
possession of certain natural properties.13 
At this point, I’d like to indicate the nature of the “priority” Hursthouse’s virtue 
ethical theory accords to character, in a better effort to understand the normative structure 
of her system (and from this try to infer some of her meta-ethical commitments).  Given 
that a great many contemporary summaries of virtue ethics claim that character is the 
primary concept within virtue ethics, it may be tempting to believe that character is itself 
the basis for many (or even all) ethical properties or concepts.  Since the aim of my 
discussion of Hursthouse is to determine what concepts or properties she believes are 
foundational, it will be beneficial to clear up exactly what is meant by the “primacy of 
character,” to determine in what way character “comes first” and what, if anything it is 
supposed to come before it.  On this she writes: 
So where do I stand on ‘the primacy of character’ [in virtue ethics, 
generally]?  For a start, I need a phrase which explicitly disavows any 
foundational or reductivist role for it, so I shall say I subscribe to the thesis 
that the concept of the virtuous agent is the focal concept of ethics. 14 
 
This is a clear endorsement of priority (1), in that it grants that the issue of character (and 
its areteic cognates) is of primary significance in normative theory.  Of course, 
Hursthouse’s account of right-action is given in somewhat reductivist terms, since the 
                                                 
12 Moore maintains in §60 of PE that the only possible justification that can be given for an action is that it 
is productive of the most good. 
13 For more on this, see Moore’s “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” in his Philosophical Studies K. Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co, London: 1922. 
14 Hursthouse, p. 82-3. 
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“right” is simply “that which a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the 
circumstances.” But she writes that although “virtue ethics may be committed to some 
sort of reductionism of the Right, it is far from committed to a wholesale reduction of 
other moral concepts.”15  So while some ethical properties, such as an action’s 
“rightness,” may be reduced to character in some way, this does not mean that all ethical 
properties can be.  Hursthouse’s position on whether or not character should be granted 
priority (2) is somewhat more underdetermined.  On this subject, she claims that an 
understanding of character is needed “to understand both action guidance and action 
assessment, to understand why it is sometimes so difficult to see what should be done and 
why we accept advice, to understand irresolvable and tragic dilemmas and the unity of 
the virtues, and to fine-tune, and thereby fully understand, our virtue and vice concepts” 
as well as moral motivation.16  She clearly regards character as playing a powerful role in 
rendering ethics intelligible and, though her list is not exhaustive of all the topics 
available in ethics, it would not be unreasonable to imagine her claiming that a 
knowledge of character is necessary for a full understanding (although perhaps not a 
basic understanding) of all ethical concepts.   This seems to be consistent with (if not 
implied by) her earlier statement that neo-Aristotelian theories are not ‘committed to a 
reductive definition of the concepts of good and evil in terms … of the virtuous agent, 
only to maintaining a close connection between them.”17  For these reasons, Hursthouse 
                                                 
15 ibid. 
16 ibid. 
17 p. 81. 
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does not believe that it is appropriate to indict virtue ethics for using certain ethical 
concepts – both deontic and areteic – without providing them with reductive definitions.18 
Neurathianism 
 
Before examining in detail how Hursthouse proposes to analyze individual people 
(as well as biological organisms generally) it is worth considering some potential 
difficulties confronting theorists hoping to construct a naturalistic account of relevant 
moral terms, as well as any potential evaluative procedures in which these terms may be 
used.  On the one hand, a naturalistic evaluative theory could attempt to use the 
explanatory framework and conceptual devices of the natural sciences, making use of 
only those ideas which are accessible from a seemingly evaluatively neutral perspective.  
Hursthouse finds this approach troublesome because she believes that if one attempts to 
maintain scientific objectivity by not importing intrinsically normative terms, it does not 
seem that one’s theory will be able to get very far off the ground.  Alternatively, one 
could simply work from entirely within some culturally available ethical viewpoint and 
seek to find, by appeal to the sciences, some sort of foundation or justification for these 
views.  This, she argues, would also be problematic in that it would produce little more 
than a set of rationalizations for pre-existing moral ideas instead of providing a robust 
philosophical argument for them.  Hursthouse’s third alternative, the one she endorses, is 
to assume “without argument” what she calls a “Neurathian” approach to ethical inquiry 
                                                 
18 Nicholas Sturgeon argues quite convincingly in “Moral Explanations” (anthologized in Essays on Moral 
Realism Sayre-McCord, Geoffery, ed. [Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1988]) that it is not a desideratum 
for naturalistic objectivist theories that they be able to provide reductive definitions for evaluative terms.  
This point will be taken up later. 
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– an approach that follows, at least in pattern, a line of thinking originally laid out by 
Quine.19  
The Neurathian approach to ethics proceeds by acknowledging that there is “no 
basing knowledge on an independent foundation.”20  To recognize this is just to affirm 
that there is no way to begin a philosophical project without bringing to bear, in an 
important way, what we already believe about a vast number of topics.  This is not to say 
that foundationalism as such is somehow wrongheaded or otherwise misbegotten, but 
rather to point out that whatever foundations we may provide for a given set of views will 
be shaped by the set of beliefs that inevitably inform them, be they beliefs “about the 
world” or beliefs about the ways that language can properly be employed (including 
semantic and syntactic commitments).  Within the Neurathian approach, we do not begin 
to philosophize tabula rasa and, as such, we cannot and should not attempt to absolutely 
purge philosophical theories of any and all beliefs that we came in with (or set them on a 
foundation that is independent of all such pre-philosophical beliefs).  If this is true of 
philosophical knowledge generally, it entails that there is not some epistemically 
privileged view-of-ethical-space-from-nowhere from which we can value-neutrally 
establish the foundation of our ethical theory.  This just means that when we begin the 
task of constructing an ethics, we should take into account the moral beliefs that we had 
coming into the project.  This does not mean that we cannot have radical doubts about 
our moral beliefs, and neither does this that the project of an objective or naturalistic 
                                                 
19 p. 193. 
20 p. 165-67 
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ethics is doomed from the outset.21,22  Rather, it is possible for us to empirically and 
analytically revise our theories in light of relevant evidence (including scientific 
evidence) and experience in a reliable way that accurately and progressively captures 
more moral truth.  This is, she claims, the proper pattern for ethical investigation to 
follow.  First, we begin to philosophize within a pre-existing ethical framework, and 
proceed from a set of ethically neutral facts about the world that anyone could accept 
independently of moral beliefs.  We then set up a dialectical process between the two in 
order to sharpen and make more accurate our understanding of the moral domain.  
Serious and radical ethical reflection, Hursthouse maintains, is entirely consistent with 
proceeding within an “acquired ethical outlook.”23  
Evaluation of Social Animals: The Four Aspects and The Four Ends 
 
An account of normative ethics is largely concerned with providing an account of 
how we ought to evaluate particular actions, traits, people.  In order to understand the 
overall structure of Hursthouse’s theory, it is necessary to grasp how she believes the 
process of evaluation ought to proceed and what it ought to consider.  It is, in my opinion, 
easiest to begin by looking at and analyzing those features of the world she considers to 
be most ethically important in order to start uncovering a meta-ethics consistent with her 
normative theory.  Hursthouse provides an excellent summary of her views regarding 
how one ought to evaluate social animals, writing that a good one is “well fitted or 
endowed with respect to (i) its parts, (ii) its operations, (iii) its actions, and (iv) its desires 
                                                 
21 Indeed, Richard Boyd outlines a Neurathian approach (albeit within a meta-ethical context) in his article  
“How to be a Moral Realist” (anthologized in Sayre-McCord, 1988)  
22 By “objective” here I simply mean those theories which maintain that moral value exists independently 
of the affective states (as well as the beliefs) of particular individuals. 
23 p. 166. 
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and emotions; whether it is thus well fitted or endowed is determined by whether these 
four aspects serve (1) its individual survival, (2) the continuance of the species, (3) its 
characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic enjoyment, and (4) the good 
functioning of its social group – in the ways characteristic of the species.”24  These last 
four elements (labeled with Arabic numerals) are the “four ends” by reference to which 
the first four elements (labeled with Roman numerals) are evaluated, in part, as either 
good or bad.  Hursthouse does not believe, however, that a trait’s status as a virtue is 
entirely determined by its relationship to these four ends.  Recall that Hursthouse places a 
great deal of importance on how her theory begins from and works within an acquired 
ethical outlook; traits are evaluated both by reference to these four ends and to the 
acquired ethical outlook in a somewhat dialectical manner.25 
At this stage, Hursthouse urges us to note several features about her account of 
evaluation, of which I will mention only those that I find to be most salient for the 
purposes of determining a consistent meta-ethics.  Firstly, it is objective in the sense that 
the truth value of evaluative propositions is not in any significant way the product of the 
evaluator’s desires or interests.  I will return to what constitutes objectivity later on, since 
Hursthouse’s views become less clear in light of her views about the role that the four 
ends play (or don’t play) in the justification provided for action.  Secondly, evaluating 
organisms by reference to her mentioned criteria is a somewhat sloppy business, and the 
                                                 
24 p. 202. 
25 That is to say, candidate virtues may be suggested by either a trait’s contribution to the four ends or to its 
place within our pre-existing ethical views.  In any event, the trait cannot be validated as a virtue unless it 
survives critical scrutiny from both sides of this evaluative fork (that is, that it is consonant with our 
considered ethical judgment as well as the four ends). 
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conclusions reached by this process are “riddled with imprecision and indeterminacy.”26  
This means that even though are a number of moral propositions that are truth-apt, their 
precise truth-value may be elusive within particular circumstances.  And finally, the truth 
of our evaluations of organisms depends on the needs of the type of organism in question, 
as well as (in the case of sentient life forms) their desires and interests.27  This last 
element will come into play, in an important way, in my later discussion of how virtue 
ethicists might respond to Moore’s criticisms of agent-relative naturalism. 
This brief recapitulation of Hursthouse’s views is, as it stands, insufficient to 
understand how she thinks we should evaluate human beings.  Social animals that we are, 
there is something importantly special about us, about the way that is characteristic of our 
species, that distinguishes us from the other higher animals.  Hursthouse calls this special 
attribute variously “rationality” or “free will” (though the use of the former is 
overwhelmingly more common).28  For my part, I believe her usage of “free will” is 
largely motivated by her desire to capture the fact that as human agents we are capable, in 
at least some sense, of setting ends for ourselves on the basis of rational deliberation.  
Other animals, by contrast, seem to lack this capacity and are thus bound to blindly 
perpetuate the largely repetitious pattern of the species.  Human behavior, unless perhaps 
it is viewed on an extremely high level of abstraction, is not simply the passive product of 
our natural propensities qua members of a particular natural kind.  Instead we act on the 
basis of beliefs and desires that are influenced by our capacity for rational evaluation and 
                                                 
26 p. 203 
27 p. 202-5.  
28 p. 221. 
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choice, and it is this feature of human beings that is largely responsible for the vast 
diversity apparent in human life, both across cultures and throughout history.29  It is only 
fitting, then, that Hursthouse’s ethics places significant emphasis on how beliefs come to 
motivate actions. 
Reasons for Action 
Hursthouse holds that “the virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions or at least one 
of a certain type or range of reasons, X” where “‘the type or range X” is typical of, and 
differs according to, whichever virtue is in question.”30   To get a feel for what these “X 
reasons” actually look like, Hursthouse lists the following as reasons a virtuous agent 
might provide for an honest action: “It was the truth” ; “He asked me” ; “It’s best to get 
things out into the open straight away.” 31 
What is somewhat conspicuous about these reasons is that they do not involve, 
nor do they seem to bear any direct relation to, the four ends by reference to which 
virtues are established.  Somewhat surprisingly, Hursthouse suggests that virtuous agents 
don’t recognize the four ends as being compelling reasons for action.  She writes that 
“what are recognized as reasons for acting are the reasons people with the relevant 
character trait do, or would, give … not the fact that the character trait in question 
sustains any of the four ends.”32 
Hursthouse’s claim here seems somewhat problematic, at least at first, because 
she holds that the things which can and should provide people with motivations for action 
                                                 
29 p. 220-24. 
30 p. 127-8. 
31 Ibid. 
32 p. 234-5. 
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– that is, the relevant grounds that a virtuous agent provides as reasons for why she acts – 
are importantly different from those features of the action that make the virtue in question 
an actual virtue; it appears that the motivational beliefs underlying a virtuous agent’s 
actions (or at least the reasons that a virtuous agent would characteristically provide for 
acting in particular manners and not others) are not tied to the meta-ethically salient 
(good-making) features of those actions, or of the states of character which 
dispositionally produce actions.  On the one hand, Hursthouse seems to be claiming that 
the four ends her ethical naturalism contains provide the objective grounding for ethical 
propositions or concepts.  On the other hand, she claims that these same four ends are not 
necessarily supposed to be invoked by the virtuous agent as the reasons compelling him 
to act; that is, a virtuous agent is not required to explicitly make reference to the four ends 
in an account of why he undertook an action.   These two claims, while not 
straightforwardly contradictory, seem to be at least potentially inconsistent in an 
important way.  The ways in which one goes about understanding or resolving these 
claims, can, I believe, lead to different attributions of meta-ethical positions.  Thus, it is 
in my estimate crucial to have an accurate understanding of her views on this matter, lest 
one dramatically misconstrue those positions to which Hursthouse is actually committed 
or, worse yet, falsely claim that that her theory is compatible with positions it is not. 
For instance, one might begin an argument with the following set of premises: 
 
P1 - Virtue ethics places normative priority, in some important way, on the 
virtuous agent. 
P2 – Virtue ethics regards areteic concepts (like “good” or “virtue”) as 
conceptually prior to deontic concepts (such as “right”) [an application of 
P1 to a particular case] 
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P3 - Right action is conceived of in terms of what a virtuous agent (who is 
good) would characteristically do in particular situations. 
P4 – Virtuous rational agents act, mold their character, and choose their 
actions on the basis of rationally held beliefs (since something like “acting 
in accordance with what we see we have reasons to do” is our 
characteristic way of going on). 
P5 – X reasons are what should count as legitimate justification for an 
action, not the particular way that a particular action promotes one or more 
of the four ends. 
 
From this set of premises, one might want to conclude that it is actually X reasons, and 
not any consideration of a trait’s relationship to the four ends of ethical naturalism, that 
actually provide the foundation for normative appraisal of human beings and their 
actions.33  X reasons, since they are what virtuous agents use to provide some sort of 
warrant for their actions, seem to have a higher degree of normative importance in 
everyday ethical life (in evaluating and providing normal accounts of why actions are 
permissible or right) than do the four ends.  The worry here is that since X reasons have 
such a great deal more explicit practical import in our evaluative practices, especially as 
far as giving reasons for why an action was good or bad is concerned, they might be of 
more importance to Hursthouse’s theory than she realizes.  Might we not, since X reasons 
are the types of things that virtuous agents appeal to in order to explain their actions, 
grant X reasons the same type of semi-foundational status that the four ends are supposed 
to have?  After all, X reasons are not just isolated propositions, but are supposed to be 
members of a particular class of reasons; it seems that one could unite what these X-
reasons have in common (if there is something in common) through a process of 
abstraction and then consider this property as being foundational within the account of 
                                                 
33 This was, incidentally, a viewpoint I thought followed logically from Hursthouse’s position after my first 
encounter with it (though it obviously conflicts with some of other views). 
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evaluating actions.  This seems to be quite consistent with the claim that the four ends are 
not part of (at least not directly) a virtuous agent’s reasons for acting. 
There are several problems with making an argument similar to that outlined 
above.  The main mistake the argument makes is that it overlooks the fact that what 
makes a virtue a virtue is not the same thing as what makes a right or properly motivated 
action a right or properly motivated action.  Hursthouse’s account of right actions clearly 
assumes, in the senses outlined above, the priority of virtue or character relative to 
“rightness.”  But this relative priority of virtue is not unique to rightness; it extends to 
explanation or motivation (X reasons) as well.  X reasons are stated reasons provided for 
action of “the type or range X” where that is “typical of, and differs according to, 
whichever virtue is in question.”34  This indicates that X reasons, even though the reasons 
may not explicitly make reference to a particular virtue, are only X reasons if they bear 
an appropriate relationship to a virtue.  Another way of stating this point is that the 
virtues have conceptual priority (priority 2) with respect to X reasons.  In both of these 
cases, virtue is the more basic concept with respect to the ultimate evaluation of actions. 
Mere recognition of these errors, however, may not be enough clear up all of the 
confusion motivating the above argument.  The above argument is essentially structured 
to answer affirmatively the following question: if virtues are to be ultimately validated 
(properly considered as virtues) by explicit reference to the four ends of ethical 
naturalism, shouldn’t actions be as well?  Or, more simply: Shouldn’t Hursthouse make it 
a requirement that a stated reason for action, in order for it to qualify as a good reason, 
                                                 
34 p. 128. 
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ought to refer to the four ends since those ends are part of what foundationally determine 
whether something is good or bad?  If the answer to this question is no, as Hursthouse 
believes, does this mean that X reasons are sufficient to explain why an action is good or 
bad?  And if so, then why don’t we dispense with the four ends altogether and build a 
normative theory around X-reasons?  Figuring out the correct answer to these questions 
(as well as the reasons why they are correct) is important if one is to understand the 
normative structure of her theory, lest one hastily grant motivation a more prominent role 
in Husthouse’s theory than it actually deserves.   
To begin to understand this a bit better, we’ll begin by noting that Hursthouse 
does not believe that the reasons virtuous people provide for their actions have to appeal 
to the language of the four ends.  The rationale for this position, however, is not 
immediately clear upon initial reflection.  It is important, if we are to understand 
Hursthouse’s argument, to figure out why the four ends, if they are somewhat 
foundational, are not to be invoked in a virtuous agent’s stated motives for performing an 
action.  The answer to this riddle is found, I believe, in the conjunction of three relevant 
factors, which I discuss below: (1) Providing a “four ends” reason for most actions places 
too much theoretical distance between the act and the virtuous agent’s true reason for 
acting for it to be appropriately relevant (in a justificatory sense) to the action; (2) though 
an account of X reasons may somehow reduce them to the four ends, this does not entail 
that X reasons have to be framed in terms of the four ends; and (3) if virtue ethics 
demanded that motivational accounts of actions revolve primarily around the four ends, it 
would lose its distinctive character as virtue ethics (that is, it would turn into “mere” 
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consequentialism).  Of these three, I regard the last as most important since it addresses 
considerations that are at the essential core of virtue ethics.   
I’ll begin my argument for (1) with an example.  Imagine for a moment that there 
are two roommates involved in a minor dispute over the use of the only television in their 
shared residence.  Kevin, one of the roommates, has spent several hours engrossed in a 
live broadcast from the floor of the North American International Auto Show.  Sam, not 
sharing Kevin’s passion for cars and not realizing the depth of his interest in them, 
eventually comes to request use of the television for an alternative purpose.  After a bit of 
bickering, Kevin becomes irritated, claiming that Sam does not understand the moral 
character of his activity, which Kevin justifies on the grounds that watching the broadcast 
is “important to his life.”   
Now, on the face of it, this is a somewhat odd justification for action, and one 
whose true meaning was not immediately apparent.  But upon reflection, Sam comes to 
understand that Kevin meant that his viewing of that particular program was importantly 
bound up with one of the long-term projects in which he was engaged – a project that 
Kevin regards as being a type of activity that was characteristically pleasure-promoting in 
a way that served to secure his enjoyment of life as a human being.  Assuming for the 
sake of argument that the type of activity that Kevin engaged in is a species of genuinely 
virtuous activity (such as “productive non-passive use of leisure time”), it would have 
been sufficient, and much less queer, for him to have appealed to an actual X reason such 
as “I’d like to continue watching this because it matters for one of my hobbies.”  This 
does not mean that Kevin’s proposed justification fails to do what it needs to do; rather, it 
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simply means that Kevin does not have to offer such a deeply foreign kind of reason in 
order to successfully get his point across. 
The issue becomes even clearer when one considers that well-reasoned 
justifications for particular actions, X reasons, tend to be more or less local from a 
theoretical standpoint.35  When someone asks “Why didn’t you cheat on your wife when 
you had the chance?” appropriately local responses (that is, X reasons) would be 
something along the lines of “doing so would have been dishonest” or “because I love 
her.”36  It would be somewhat bizarre for a typical virtuous person to respond that 
infidelity would somehow fail to promote one of the four ends; indeed, if someone 
replied to the above question “Well, I didn’t cheat on my spouse because that type of 
behavior would have deleterious effects on the ability of my species’ social group to 
function well” I have the intuition that most people would be struck by how much 
theoretical distance is between the reasons he provides for action and the actual character 
of the act being committed.  On the basis of such distance, I can imagine an ethicist (or a 
spouse, for that matter) finding “four ends” X reasons appalling rather than indicative of 
virtue. 
The argument for (2) is for a relatively weak position, namely that a virtue ethical 
theory does not have to maintain that reasons for actions be necessarily framed in 
foundational language, assuming that there is some sort of relevant foundation.  If it is the 
case that the four ends of ethical naturalism are what, in some way, ground ethical 
                                                 
35 By “local” here I simply mean that there is little theoretical or conceptual distance between the subject 
under discussion and the type of language used to describe or understand it. 
36 These types of justifications are representative of the X reasons Hursthouse gives in her own examples. 
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judgments, this does not imply that X reasons must take the form “I was compelled to 
choose action A because it promoted the naturalistic end N” or something similar.  To 
demand that reasons for action take that form is to ignore, in spectacular fashion, our 
standard practices of evaluating reasons. 
For instance, assume that we are engaged in a discussion with a scientifically 
unsophisticated member of the folk, and they are providing us with a physical 
explanation for the occurrence of some phenomenon.  It would be out of line to request 
that they furnish us with a comprehensive, reductive account for why some event 
happened as it did.  If we asked this person why our vase was broken, he could easily 
satisfy us (quite reasonably) by saying that it broke because it was fragile and had fallen 
against a hard surface because it was knocked off its stand.  No reasonable person in a 
scenario like this would require that this person provide us with a detailed physical 
account of fragility, what molecular structures are more stable than others, or why 
massive objects (like the vase and the earth) attract one another in order to be justified.  
These aspects, however interesting they may be to the specialist, are of little to no 
practical concern to the individual seeking a reason in these circumstances.  Similarly, the 
reasons that a virtuous non-philosopher provides for action do not need to include 
justification at the foundational level, nor would we want them to.  Just as it is absurd to 
demand a technical physical explanation of why unsupported objects tend to fall, it would 
be equally absurd to require that a virtuous person provide reasons for her actions that 
include explicit reference to the morally more basic features of the action before 
addressing more contextually relevant factors. 
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This takes us, finally, to point (3).  It seems clear to me that reasons framed in the 
language of the four ends tend to take on a flavor more akin to consequentialism than to 
virtue ethics.  This is unsurprising, given that the four ends are ends and that justification 
in terms of ends is characteristic of consequentialist normative theories.  Though 
Hursthouse herself is not shy about adopting features present in other major ethical 
approaches (at one point, she invites us to “by all means stop caring about how we 
distinguish ourselves and welcome our differences”) it seems that providing “four ends” 
based reasons for action, for all or even many actions, makes the virtue ethical position 
lose its distinctiveness.37  
Hursthouse is careful throughout her work to indicate that the virtuous person’s 
reasons for acting are not primarily instrumental reasons.  To this end, she spends several 
pages discussing why and how virtuous agents choose good actions “for their own sake” 
and not for the explicit purposes of securing some end.38  Virtuous agents don’t choose 
(or need to choose) actions because of the ways they characteristically promote the four 
ends; rather, they choose them because they see the action as being worthwhile or good.  
Setting the issue up this way escapes two potentially negative consequences that might 
otherwise crop up in her theory; it stops virtuous agents from needing to be, at bottom, 
consequentialists, and it counters the unappealing implication that virtuous agents can 
only become, as Plato claimed, really or fully virtuous if they have engaged in a 
substantial amount of philosophical contemplation.39  In any event, requiring that a 
                                                 
37 p. 7. 
38 p. 126-131. 
39 p. 137. 
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virtuous agent provide a ‘four ends’ reason for action would manifestly contradict 
Hursthouse’s views about how the virtuous agent regards his actions; namely, these 
actions would cease to be, in the mind of the agent, worthy of being chosen for their own 
sake and would instead be regarded as choice-worthy in virtue of their contribution to 
eudaimonia.40  The manner in which the virtuous agent is supposed to act, including the 
way that he regards his actions, will become clearer in my later discussion of how 
Hursthouse thinks humans characteristically act.  But for now, I will turn my attention 
away from Hursthouse’s normative ethics to a consideration of what meta-ethical 
positions are most consistent with her views on morality. 
Inferring a Meta-Ethics from Hursthouse  
Objectivism 
  
Summarizing the commitments of objectivism, Geoffery Sayre-McCord writes 
that objectivists “hold that the appropriate truth-conditions [for ethical propositions] 
make no reference to anyone’s subjective states or to the capacities, conventions, or 
practices of any group of people.”41  This analysis of what objectivism entails is, it seems 
to me, too strong in its requirement that objectivist theories not take into account (in any 
way) the subjective states of persons or agents.  If it were correct, Sayre-McCord’s 
analysis would exclude, inter alia, virtue theories from qualifying as objectivist on the 
grounds that they take into consideration both the beliefs and subjective states of 
character of the group “virtuous persons” as part of the truth-conditions for ethical 
                                                 
40 I still have worries about the possibility of making sense of an action’s being intrinsically choice-worthy 
(that is, choice-worthy in an agent-neutral sense) within the context of Hursthouse’s full theory, but I 
cannot address these concerns here for reasons of scope. 
41 Sayre-McCord, p.19-20. 
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judgments.  For instance, virtue ethical accounts of right action, and the moral 
propositions they generate, place a good deal of emphasis on the dispositional states of an 
agent, as well as their affective responses to the action-context (broadly construed).  This 
seems to at least potentially compromise Hursthouse’s commitment to objectivism. 
For the sake of an example, consider for a moment the case of Aristotle’s 
distinction between continent, incontinent, and fully virtuous agents.42  The continent 
agent is, roughly, an individual who possesses correct judgment about what course of 
action to take and then takes it while acting against occurrent contradictory desires; an 
incontinent agent possesses the same (correct) judgment about what to do in a given 
situation, though she gives in to desire and chooses an inappropriate or wrong action; the 
fully virtuous (temperate) agent, like the other two, also has correct judgment about what 
to do, and this judgment is acted upon without interference from any sort of contradictory 
desire (indeed, the fully virtuous agent never has inclinations or desires to perform wrong 
or vicious acts).  From these three concepts, which necessarily include information about 
the subjective states of particular types of agents, one can generate a number of ethical 
propositions such as: “the incontinent agent is not as good as the fully virtuous agent” or 
“the fully virtuous agent is morally superior to the merely continent agent.”  Aristotle 
himself, though he does not directly employ the vocabulary of continence, makes such 
claims, stating that “someone who does not enjoy fine actions is not good; for no one 
would call a person just, for instance, if he did not enjoy doing just actions, or generous if 
he did not enjoy generous actions, and similarly with the other virtues” (1099a17-20). 
                                                 
42 Trans. Irwin.  This distinction is informally discussed in NE 1099a8-29, and it receives a lengthy 
treatment in Bk. VII. 
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I am not willing to concede (and neither, I believe, would Sayre-McCord) that 
Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories are not genuinely objectivist (on 
Sayre-McCord’s definition) simply on the grounds that they incorporate desire-facts into 
the truth-conditions for certain of the ethical propositions they can generate.  The main 
reason for my reluctance here is that under virtue ethical theories, knowledge of facts 
pertaining to relevant subjective states is alone insufficient to establish the goodness or 
badness of an agent or her actions.  Under a somewhat crude cognitivist subjectivism, in 
contrast to which a cognitivist objectivism is supposed to stand, desires or attitudes are 
fundamentally the good-or-right-making factors that underlie the truth-value of moral 
statements.  On such theories, the value or disvalue of a particular action is determined by 
the presence or absence of certain subjective states, and thus the truth or falsity of 
declarative moral sentences is determined by such states.  If an agent wants to eat an 
apple, and this desire for an apple is congruent with his overall web of preferences and 
desires, then the apple and the action of eating it are, in virtue of the agent’s desire, good.  
Consequently, the sentence “Evan’s eating of the apple was a good thing” is true, 
provided that the relevant set of desires obtains.  Within subjectivism (as I conceive it as 
being distinct from objectivism), desires, preferences, or other subjective states are 
constitutive of something’s goodness or badness.  Hursthouse’s position is decidedly 
opposed to this type of reasoning.  Even though the desires and beliefs of particular 
agents are taken into account for the purposes of evaluation, largely because we are 
biological entities who possess beliefs and desires, these are not what strictly determine 
the truth-value of the resulting evaluations.   
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Neither do beliefs and desires of any particular class of persons serve as good-
making properties for things external to the persons who possess them, as is standard in 
the subjectivist scheme.  We could live in a world without virtuous agents, a world 
populated by individuals who had nothing but inappropriate desires by the standards of 
our acquired ethical outlook and the four ends.  What is good, by Hursthouse’s standards, 
would not be considered as such by all the agents in this world; yet this would not rob 
these things of their goodness, on Hursthouse’s theory.  That particular things are not 
regarded as good by some (or even all) people does not mean that they are, in virtue of 
this fact, not good.  Similarly, within a world populated by no one but virtuous agents it 
wouldn’t be true that whatever they desired or believed to be good would be ipso facto 
good.  It is in this respect that she writes that “‘we,’ whoever we may be, can no more 
decide [that is, we cannot ‘decide’ at all] what it is for a human being to be a good human 
being than we can decide what it is for a cactus to be a good cactus;” it is in this respect 
that her meta-ethical view qualifies as objectivist.43 
Two Kinds Of Naturalism 
In order to fully grasp what other aspects of Hursthouse’s theory are meta-
ethically interesting and informative, it will pay to examine in what sense, or senses, it 
qualifies as naturalistic.  Virtue ethicists often pride themselves on being naturalistic, 
although naturalism is not a necessary feature of virtue ethics generally considered.44  But 
what does “naturalism” really mean?  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry 
                                                 
43 p. 240. 
44 For more on this, see Annas, Julia.  “Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism?” in Virtue Ethics: Old and  
New ed. Gardiner, Stephen. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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on naturalism makes it a point to emphasize that “naturalism” is not a univocal term.45  
Naturalistic theories can be those which do not invoke supernatural or non-natural 
properties in their explanations (that is, they can endorse ontological naturalism) or they 
can be naturalistic insofar as their methods are congruent with, and largely sympathetic 
toward, those used in the sciences (they can endorse methodological naturalism).  
Recognizing this ambiguity is crucial for understanding the projects of particular virtue 
ethicists.  A critic of these theories who is not conscious of the dual senses of 
“naturalistic” could seriously misapprehend the ontological commitments of virtue ethics, 
as well as the character of its methodology. 
On the more pressing meta-ethical question, there does not seem to be definitive, 
conclusive evidence that Hursthouse’s normative theory is naturalistic or not. While she 
consistently maintains a tight link between obviously natural properties (such as the 
attributes of organisms) and obviously normative properties, she seems to make a 
conscious effort to eschew making identity claims between the two.  She never claims, 
for instance, that ‘virtue is such and such’ where we come to understand that she intends 
an unambiguous and sharply defined natural property.  Her theory seems to be at least 
potentially consistent with non-naturalism, though I think that it would be extraordinarily 
unlikely for her to endorse such a position (given the overwhelmingly naturalistic 
character of her philosophical method, her implicit disavowal of religiosity, and the style 
of her prose).   
                                                 
45 Papineau, David.  “Naturalism” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/ 
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If Hursthouse were to claim that moral goodness simply is a matter of an attribute, 
action, or state of character’s promotion of one of the four ends, then this appears to 
challenge (at least potentially) her belief that ethical theories have to get off the ground in 
a way that explicitly recognizes pre-existing ethical concepts and practices.  The four 
ends of human action are, in point of fact, accessible from a “value-neutral,” scientific 
standpoint and a thing’s contribution to the four ends is in principle ascertainable using 
neutral observation (that is, observation that makes no reference to our pre-existing 
normative framework).  If this was all that is necessary for morality to get off the ground, 
then Hursthouse’s Neurathian approach might be largely dispensable.  Operating under 
the “moral goodness is simply a thing’s contributing to the four ends” approach, all one 
would have to do to answer many moral questions would be to establish, through some 
form of analysis, what a particular candidate virtue or vice term actually means, then see 
what things in the world this meaning actually picks out, and finally see if these things do 
actually contribute positively to one or more of the four ends.  On this model, our pre-
existing normative framework (what we believe is right or wrong before we begin the 
task of philosophizing) would not have much substantial input into the ethical procedure, 
aside from, perhaps, suggesting certain candidate virtues or vices. 
 To vindicate Hursthouse’s Neurathianism, though, one must remember that on her 
view for something to qualify as a virtue, it has to contribute to one of the four ends in a 
way characteristic of the species.  Reiterating this point helps to make fully clear why the 
four ends are not ultimately foundational in Hursthouse’s normative ethics.  It is not 
enough for a candidate virtue to qualify as a bone fide virtue that it promotes pleasure or 
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contributes to an organism’s individual survival; these things are of course necessary, and 
they importantly constrain what does and does not qualify.  But just as important to a 
candidate virtue is the manner in which the particular trait contributes to the four ends.  
This is the point in Hursthouse’s theory where we leave, at least in her view, the realm of 
the scientifically neutral and enter into the “avowedly normative.” 
Our characteristic ways of going on are, importantly “rational ways” – ways that 
reason can correctly identify as worthy of pursuit.46  While statistically it may be the case 
that most people act in order to secure one or more of the four ends, and that they do so 
on the basis of deliberative processes (for instance, they might think about whether or not 
a particular action will bring them pleasure or pain) they do not do so because they think 
that its rational, but rather in a way that regards reason as merely instrumental.  They 
often don’t consider whether a behavior is something that can rightly be endorsed by 
reason, but rather simply use reason as a tool to secure things they desire.  For instance, 
many of the people we interact with seem to deliberate about and choose different 
courses of action that, in varying ways and degrees, serve to promote their individual 
survival or the well-being of their social group.  However, the reasons they provide for 
their action (as well as, more broadly, the motivational structure behind their action) are 
not rational in the way that I think Hursthouse has in mind here.  The reasons that people 
of average moral worth provide for their actions do not characteristically reflect a full 
rational appreciation of the moral merit of the act; rather these reasons, when taken 
together, are often constituted by a mish-mash of conflicting desires, purposes, and 
                                                 
46 Hursthouse, p. 222. 
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values.  So while such individuals may, in fact, be acting in some (or even the majority 
of) cases in ways that secure the four ends of human action, the means that they employ 
to set these ends are by and large irrational in an important way.  Because of this 
Hursthouse believes that they fail to act in accordance with our “characteristic way of 
going on;” consequently, she writes that maintaining that “‘our characteristic way of 
going on’ is to do what we can rightly see what we have reason to do, is to give up with a 
vengeance any idea that most human beings do what is ‘characteristic’ of human beings 
to do.”47  Thus a descriptive account of what most people typically do is not supposed to 
have much moral importance, even though this behavior may be in some (perhaps 
statistical) way characteristic of human beings.  A theory built on such data would not 
conform to the ethical framework in which Hursthouse is working in a Neurathian way; 
that framework contains, as its most important element, the belief that human beings have 
a normatively characteristic way of acting and that it is a rational way.  At this point, it 
would be wise to note that the two most important factors considered by Hursthouse’s 
theory are (1) the four ends and (2) this normative conception of rationality; these 
correspond to the domains of the scientific and of the avowedly normative respectively.  
Since these elements are of primary importance, they ought to be given ample attention 
by anyone trying to uncover a meta-ethics consistent with her normative theory. 
What makes her argument about our characteristic rationality somewhat hard to 
follow is that she does not offer up much of an explanation as to why rationality, as our 
characteristic way of going on, has some sort of normative authority over us.  Moreover, 
                                                 
47 ibid p. 223. 
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the precise nature of this normativity is not particularly clear.  Is it epistemic?  Is it more 
straightforwardly ethical?  Is it both?  Unfortunately the answers to these questions are 
not spelled out, since Hursthouse operates on the unargued-for assumption that importing 
an existing normative framework into her theory is unproblematic.  Regardless of all this, 
the four ends are able to be considered scientifically and provided with a naturalistic 
definition, as is, at least in principle, “reason.”  If this last point about reason seems 
somewhat contentious, realize that all that I mean here is that reason is not – at least by a 
healthy number of philosophers – considered to be some queer supernatural or non-
natural attribute that is not amenable to empirical study.48  And though Hursthouse’s 
theory imports normativity (which is arguably not the kind of thing that can be described 
in naturalistic terms) in an important way, she does not present at length what type of 
property normativity is or where it comes from.  That is not really her concern, at least in 
the work at hand.  So as it stands, Hursthouse’s work is filled throughout with moral 
properties that are given naturalistic interpretations (wherever she bothers to give such 
interpretations) but these do not take the form of identity claims holding between 
evaluative properties and natural, non-evaluative properties (such as “goodness is X” 
where X is a naturalistic property). 
 To summarize, Hursthouse’s normative theory exhibits features that ally it with 
cognitivism and objectivism.  The ontological status of evaluative properties, however, is 
underdetermined by the arguments contained in her book. 
G.E. Moore’s Criticisms of Egoism and Naturalism 
                                                 
48 There are, of course, a number who do not uphold this viewpoint but I’m only trying to indicate here that 
it is at least reasonable to maintain this position. 
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Laying out Moore’s meta-ethical views, as well as understanding the problems he 
understands naturalism to have, is a task I will undertake by examining Moore’s attack on 
hedonistic egoism.  This version of egoism is naturalistic in that it identifies “good” with 
a natural property: pleasure.  It is also naturalistic in that many questions pertaining to 
whether or not an action is right or good can be answered through the naturalistic and 
empirically-informed methodology of the sciences.  That is, a philosopher operating 
under the assumptions of hedonism is in principle capable of looking at the world and 
studying certain aspects of it how particular properties, actions, or entities are conducive 
or deleterious to pleasure.  Examining Moore’s criticisms of egoism is especially 
important because egoism, as a theory which adopts the agent’s own interest as being of 
fundamental significance, eschews the existence of “universal good” or of “good” which 
is fundamentally detached from the agent himself.  Hedonistic egoism, as we shall see, 
importantly agrees with Hursthouse’s virtue ethics with respect to both naturalism (in 
some way) and agent-relative (or agent-indexed) value. 
 Moore begins his criticism of egoism by claiming that ordinary language users 
tend to conflate the issue of “goodness” and “mineness” in a misleading way such that 
they regard things which are good-in-themselves as things that are “good for me.”  That 
people regard things other than pleasure as being egoistic values (personal advancement, 
a raise, one’s reputation) is a consequence, Moore believes, of the failure to recognize 
that “that which is mine” and “that which is good” do not, when conjoined, produce “that 
which is my own good” in the sense intended by the egoist.  When the egoist claims that 
something is “good for him” he seems to suggest that there is some property (namely, 
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“good”) that is indexed or otherwise tied to him in some manner such that others do not 
have necessarily have to regard that thing as good when they examine the relevant moral 
features of the particular case in question.  That is just to say that egoists seem to be 
committed to something like “there are things that are good for me that are not good for 
you.”  Moore believes this is a mistake, claiming that the goodness of my having X 
means simply either that X is good in itself, or that my having X is good in itself, or both.  
On this, he writes that “the only thing which can belong to me, which can be mine, is 
something which is good, and not the fact that it is good”.49  A good thing can belong to 
me, and the fact that a thing belongs to me can be good.  In neither of these cases, 
however, is the goodness itself “mine” in any meaningful sense; neither the goodness of 
the object nor the goodness of the possession is exclusively private.  The idea of “my 
own good,” Moore claims, is only intelligible if it is taken to designate something that is 
“mine” and is also “good” – good absolutely, apart from any person.  The egoist, on 
Moore’s account, is not warranted in claiming that there are things that are themselves 
good but that this goodness is also somehow tied to distinct individual agents.  In this 
respect, Moore writes that “the Egoist’s happiness must either be good in itself, and so a 
part of Universal Good, or else it cannot be good in itself at all: there is no escaping this 
dilemma.”50 
In addition believing that the notion of “good for me” is incoherent, Moore also 
believes that the egoist’s substantive and conceptual claims about what constitute 
goodness are open to criticisms that they commit the naturalistic fallacy and are subject to 
                                                 
49 Moore, p.98. 
50 p.100, second emphasis added. 
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the Open Question Argument.  Even if it is the case that all good things are those which 
stand or participate in a relevant naturalistic relationship to the moral agent, it does not 
follow that goodness is this relationship.  The fact that a certain action p would promote 
an agent’s interest or pleasure in some set of circumstances and the fact that p is, in any 
relevantly similar case, universally considered good does not necessarily mean that p’s 
goodness is an analytic/a priori consequence of this property’s being there.  It does not 
mean that “good” is conceptually identical with the relevant relationship; rather, it simply 
means that “goodness” is invariably concurrent with certain other predicates.  Simply put, 
Moore would argue that egoism commits the naturalistic fallacy by identifying 
“goodness” with another distinct but concurrent property or state of affairs. 
Egoism is also subject to Moore’s Open Question Argument.  If one represents 
the natural property by reference to which the egoist defines goodness as “E,” the egoist’s 
position can be summarized as “whatever is E is good.”  If this account is correct, then 
sentences taking that form (“whatever is E is good”) are analytic, implying that the 
question “are things that are E good?” must analytically be answered in the affirmative.  
Yet, Moore would claim, this question is not closed once one understands the facts of the 
matter; one can significantly ask that question without presupposing a conclusive answer.  
Thus “goodness” and “E” are not analytically interchangeable and are therefore not 
identical concepts.   
This, in outline, is Moore’s basic argument against egoism: it contradicts itself by 
positing multiple goods which are each “the only good thing there is.”  Over and above 
this, it is subject to the naturalistic fallacy and Open Question Argument. 
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Moore and Indexical Value 
 
Moore’s argument against egoism can be generalized to other agent-relative 
accounts of moral value, including (as we’ll see shortly) Hursthouse’s ethics.  The reason 
for this is his insistence that the idea of an indexical value is fundamentally confused.  
His point there, stated in slightly more abstract language than it appeared originally, is 
that if something is good for some individual then it must be good in itself (a part of 
Universal Good) because the notion of being “good for” is incoherent. 
The idea of a thing’s goodness being relative to specific individuals simply 
doesn’t make sense within Moore’s model because to be good is to be good – period.  
Insofar as something exhibits the property “goodness,” it is intrinsically good, good-in-
itself, good apart from its relation to anything else.  In other words, to be good is to be 
agent-neutrally good.  This point, if true, causes problems for theorists arguing for the 
existence of specifically agent-relative values because it denies their possibility by 
asserting the premise that if something is good, it is necessarily agent-neutrally good (and 
only agent-neutrally good) in a way that remains normatively binding.  The keystone of 
Moore’s argument against “good-for-me-ness” is the belief that “good” is somehow 
simple, and therefore incapable of being broken down into parts.51  If Moore were right 
about that, it would preclude the possibility inter alia of genuinely relational values as 
such, since relations are, by their very nature, complex (in that they hold between two or 
more entities or properties).  Of course, even if Moore is right here there is the possibility 
that one could simply hold that “good” (or some other evaluative cognate) is a simple 
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property which supervenes on, and only on, relational properties.  Even if this were the 
case, however, the normative or evaluative property would not be, in itself, relational 
even though it supervenes on relational predicates.  Correspondingly, the concept 
designating the property “good” would not be relational either. 
Smith finds Moore’s rejection of agent-relative values notable, and he cites an 
incongruity between commonsense morality and Moore’s theory.  He finds it queer that 
on Moore’s account the special obligations we (operating under commonsense morality) 
believe we owe to our friends and loved ones are not created by our particular relation to 
them, but rather by the presence of some mysterious, intrinsically valuable metaphysical 
property. 52  We tend to believe that we owe particular people certain things (that we 
should act for their sake, at least in part) not always because doing so will create the most 
good in the universe, but rather because they are our friends, family, or lovers.  Indeed, if 
Moore is correct in his belief that one is obligated to act for the sake of creating the most 
good in the world, one might be obligated to act in surprising ways within novel 
scenarios.  For instance, it may be possible for an action (or set of actions) X to be 
maximally productive of good, minimally productive of evil, and nevertheless require us 
to divorce ourselves from (or even, perhaps, be injurious to) those dearest to us.  This 
point is similar to objections levied against versions of act utilitarianism, wherein certain 
intuitively reprehensible actions are suggested as proper by the utilitarian calculus.  But 
aside from the intuitive implausibility of Moore’s theory, it nevertheless needs to be 
rationally answered in order for commonsense morality to be justified. 
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Moreover, if Moore is correct it is not only commonsense morality that becomes 
unjustified, but agent-relative theories of value as such.  This is because Moore’s 
argument does not allow for the possibility of non-agent-neutral values.  The main reason 
Moore denies the existence of such value is that Moore considers goodness to be a simple 
property, a fact which (if true) would render any form of analysis of the concept 
impossible.  His belief in the simplicity of “good” is ultimately what motivates his claim 
that “propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic…”.53  If 
Moore were correct, then whatever naturalistic property one were to posit as equivalent to 
“goodness” would always leave open the possibility that a person could know that a thing 
has naturalistic property P but also maintain without contradiction that he doesn’t know 
that it is good.  The argument against analysis is an enormous stumbling block for anyone 
trying to offer an account of what evaluative concepts conceptually contain, and it’s one 
that any philosopher wanting to provide an indexical account of ethical terms must 
address.   
At this point, it should be somewhat clear that that naturalists and agent-relativists 
(including egoists and, as we shall ultimately see, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists) need 
to make it a point to be conscientious of the perennial naturalistic fallacy and Open 
Question Argument, lest they be insufficiently agued-for.  These are issues which must 
either be accepted on their own terms, in which case one’s theory must ultimately be 
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consistent with them, or be rejected after uncovering some fundamental flaw in their 
reasoning which proves fatal for Moorean criticism.54 
Applying Moore’s Concerns to Virtue Ethics 
Hursthouse’s account of moral terms is, like egoism, importantly agent-relative in 
that according to it traits are judged to be good or bad by reference to the particular 
individual who possesses these traits.  This conception of agent-relativity is one that 
focuses on how moral value, not motivations, is a function of the relationship between to 
things.  What does this actually look like within the virtue-ethical framework?  Virtue 
ethics begins with the supposition that things ought to be evaluated in ways that are 
appropriate to and commensurate with what the thing in question is.  X’s goodness is, on 
this account, determined importantly by what X is.  Candidate virtues, for instance, are 
evaluated on the basis of whether or not they are excellences appropriate to the particular 
type of thing to which they belong; whether or not a candidate virtue qualifies as genuine 
is a function of the type of thing that instantiates the particular trait in question.  So 
whereas sharpness is said to be a virtue in a knife, it is a defect or vice in a child’s toy.  
Of course neither knives nor toys are agents, and thus the excellences or deficiencies that 
they exhibit cannot be said to be agent-relative unless one considers them in relation to 
particular agents who employ them.  Evaluative terms, then, it would seem, are not agent-
relative but rather kind-relative.  However, since the domain of things subject to moral 
evaluation - the domain that Hursthouse addresses throughout her present work – is 
                                                 
54 There have been many responses to Moore attempting to show why his arguments against naturalism fail, 
and the majority of them confront Moore with arguments that would not be of special interest to the virtue 
ethicist.  For that reason, I will not consider them even though I believe that Moore’s arguments are 
disastrously flawed. 
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populated by human beings, we can assume that moral evaluations are agent-relative (to 
the extent that humans are taken to be agents) to a significant extent.   
The scope of this agent-relativity is somewhat different from that of egoism.  
Whereas egoism posits that moral value is a product of how certain things (such as 
actions or traits) contribute to an end (the agent’s own pleasure) unique to specific 
individuals, virtue ethics holds that moral value is a function, at least in part, of how traits 
relate to ends which are by and large shared by the species (the four ends of Hursthouse’s 
ethical naturalism).  But this is not much of a concern for the purpose at hand, as it does 
not importantly alter how Hursthouse’s theory might be attacked by someone 
sympathetic to Moore’s project.  This is because both egoism and virtue ethics are 
committed to holding that there are certain things which are “good for X” where X is a 
particular individual and a species respectively.  Moore’s attack on the idea of relative 
value seems to apply equally to both. 
Hursthouse would likely respond to Moore here by noting a logical feature of the 
way we use the term “good.”  Many contemporary virtue theorists (including both Foot 
and Hursthouse) as well as some of their immediate predecessors (such as G.E. 
Anscombe and Peter Geach) make it a point to note that the word “good” functions as an 
attributive adjective.55  To illustrate the distinction between attributive adjectives and 
predicative adjectives, consider the following two propositions: (1) X is a silver sedan ; 
(2) X is an inexpensive Mercedes.  The first proposition can be logically split into two 
                                                 
55 This point was first made by Peter Geach in “Good and Evil,” reprinted in Foot, Philippa (ed.) Theories 
of Ethics United States: Oxford University Press (1967). pp. 64–73.  My explanation below follows the 
same basic pattern of his example. 
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predications: “X is silver” and “X is a sedan” in a truth-preserving manner.  Because the 
word “silver” can be predicated on X apart from the particular noun it modifies (in this 
case, ‘sedan’) it is considered to be a predicative adjective.  By contrast, the proposition 
“X is an inexpensive Mercedes” cannot be split into two predications; it cannot be split 
up into “X is inexpensive” and “X is a Mercedes” without loss.  Whether or not 
something is inexpensive is, as this case shows, importantly tied to whatever it is we’re 
talking about.  A $7.00 soda at the movie theater is surely expensive, regardless of the 
fact that it costs less than a relatively inexpensive $30,000 Mercedes.  In order to 
accurately employ attributive adjectives, we need to know what kind of thing it is we’re 
talking about.  If all we know about a particular case is that there exists some thing and 
that this thing has the price of $50 dollars, we are in no position to judge if it is or is not 
expensive; depending on whether or not the thing in question is a mansion or a trash 
heap, the answer to the question “is it inexpensive?” is importantly contingent.  In the one 
case, one would reply “Yes, that’s quite inexpensive for a mansion” and in the other “No, 
that’s far too expensive for what it is.” 
The term “good,” Hursthouse might likely argue (since she holds that it is an 
attributive adjective), is necessarily something which is relative to the thing in question.56  
The kind of the thing we are considering (be it a purpose, a member of a species, an 
artifact or something altogether different) is crucial for rendering its goodness intelligible.  
Goodness, on this account, is necessarily the kind of thing that “is for” and moral 
goodness is something that is good for an agent (considered in a particular way).  In order 
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to adopt Geach’s line of reasoning and use it to avoid Moore’s criticisms, Hursthouse 
doesn’t need to maintain that all instances of the word “good” function attributively; 
rather, she would only need to make a case for the existence of agent-relative value (and 
not claim that all value is necessarily agent-relative).  Of course, such an argument for the 
plausibility and correctness of agent-relative value is only as strong as the logical 
arguments about the nature of “good” upon which it rests.  While there are some worries 
in the literature about how much power Geach’s argument actually has (and whether or 
not it is fallacious), it still seems as though there is a plausible case to be made for such 
value in a way that is amenable to the virtue-ethicist.57 
Hursthouse’s arguments are framed in ways that make it unclear as to whether or 
not she commits the naturalistic fallacy or could be countered by use of the open question 
argument.  As I noted in the section on her naturalism, Hursthouse’s book makes very 
few identity claims and those claims she does make are not so substantive that they 
equate evaluative properties with what we might consider to be value-neutral properties.  
In fact, most of the terms she defines are either somewhat uncontroversial (like what she 
means by “character”) or are particular virtues (which are given in largely normative 
terms).  This strategy is rhetorically helpful in that it allows her to clearly lay out the 
overall structure of her normative theory while staying on track and not going off into 
prolonged meta-ethical speculation.  The strategy might be seen as somewhat 
aggravating, in that it leaves a substantial gap between her account of morality and its 
most profound foundations.  While I am sympathetic to this aggravation, since I would 
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Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 159. (Apr., 1990), pp. 129-154.  
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have liked to have seen more identity claims made in Hursthouse’s book, I don’t find it to 
be particularly troubling as far as her naturalism is concerned.  Though one might expect 
her, qua naturalist, to provide some account of how her theory’s normative concepts 
reduce to physical (or otherwise natural) properties, this is not a desideratum for 
naturalism, as we shall see below. 
Moore seems to believe that the naturalist, in order to succeed at her task, must 
make a conceptual claim that asserts a synonymy relation between certain moral 
predicates and certain physicalistic predicates.58  That is, in order for a naturalistic 
analysis of moral properties to hold, Moore thinks that it must take the form of a 
reductive definition (equating moral and non-moral properties).  This, he believes, is 
impossible because to do so would commit the naturalistic fallacy and render the 
proposed definition subject to the Open Question Argument. 
The demand for reductive definitions of evaluative terms poses no real problem 
for the would-be virtue meta-ethicist (and, as I’ve already noted, Hursthouse is not 
particularly keen on providing them). This is because naturalists, in general, do not need 
to meet this demand for reductive definitions in order to remain consistent.  Sturgeon 
makes this point by noting that even if physicalism and ethical naturalism are true, it does 
not necessarily follow that ethical/evaluative facts “can equally well be expressed in 
some other, nonmoral idiom”59  This is just to say that there might very well not be any 
                                                 
58 This is where Moore’s revised definition of ‘naturalism’ comes into play; no longer defined by reference 
to ‘exists within time and space,’ Moore ultimately regards ‘natural’ as “that which is dealt with by the 
sciences.” 
59 Sturgeon, Nicholas.  “Moral Explanations” (1985) in Essays on Moral Realism. Geoffery Sayre-McCord, 
ed.   
New York: Cornell University Press. p.240. 
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non-moral terms in a language that refer to the same exact natural property to which 
moral terms refer (even though there might be other terms, properties, or consideration 
which are closely related to them, such as the four ends).  If such circumstances actually 
obtain, then anyone wanting to refer to the property of “moral goodness” would have to 
do so with terms that are themselves moral.  We have seen that Hursthouse is reluctant to 
provide reductive definitions, even within the domain of the avowedly normative.  But, 
for the reasons just outlined, this is no challenge for her naturalism.  Indeed, it seems as 
though Hursthouse could adopt the view that avowedly normative concepts (such as, 
perhaps, “our characteristic way of going on”) do not fully map onto properties that fall 
into the domain of the sciences (which includes the four ends).  Adopting this perspective 
would cast her moral theory as importantly naturalistic without requiring that she make 
the types of identity claims that are associated with the naturalistic fallacy.60 
Additionally, it does not seem as though Hursthouse’s theory, as it stands now, is 
subject to Moore’s Open Question Argument.  This is, again, in large part because of the 
paucity of identity statements included in her normative theory.  Since she makes very 
few of these claims, there are very few questions to ask and even fewer which might be 
considered open.  A good deal of this is a product of her unabashed use of unreduced, 
“avowedly normative” concepts; this insulates her somewhat, since the definitions she 
does actually provide are markedly less controversial than something like “pleasure is the 
good.”  But still Moore might raise an eyebrow at Hursthouse’s four ends, given their 
naturalistic character.  These ends, even though they play a central part in Hursthouse’s 
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account of evaluation, are not the type of material about which one can ask “It promotes 
the ends, but it is it good?” in hopes of exposing a flaw with the theory. 
In her discussion of the four ends of ethical naturalism, Hursthouse makes it clear 
that she does not think that a trait’s contribution to these ends is sufficient to justify our 
belief that the trait is indeed a virtue.  While the four ends importantly constrain what can 
and what cannot qualify as a virtue, they do not have the final say on the matter.  Once 
we determine that a particular trait does foster one or more of the ends, we can still 
meaningfully ask whether or not the trait in question is indeed good without expecting a 
definite answer.  This is simply a consequence of her belief that a trait’s goodness is not 
identical to its relationship to the four ends.  Once a trait meets the necessary criteria of 
fostering the four ends, it still needs to survive critical reflective scrutiny within our 
existing ethical framework.  We may find a trait that promotes one of the ends yet 
properly classify it as a non-virtue from our guiding ethical perspective.  So even though 
the four ends to play an important role in determining what we should and should not 
count as virtues, they do not bring with them the type of conceptual necessity (property 
identity statements) that is needed to fuel the Open Question Argument. 
Conclusion 
  While Hursthouse’s normative theories might be compatible with other 
metaethics incompatible with the ones I’ve suggested here, I have nevertheless shown 
that there exists a set of views that are consistent with her normative ethics.  Over and 
above this, I have indicated some plausible strategies of argumentation that would be of 
use for someone wanting to defend Hursthouse’s theory against Moorean criticism.  My 
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work here is far from conclusive, which is only natural given the relatively immature 
state of modern virtue ethics; I do hope, however, that it plays some role in arousing 
interest in examining the way that foundational issues in meta-ethics relate to normative 
virtue ethics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
